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URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c9594What is the relationship between a country’s ﬁnancial development and its
economic growth? And how do a country’s ﬁnancial development and eco-
nomic growth relate to the extent of its participation in the global economy?
In particular, is there a relationship between domestic ﬁnancial develop-
ment and participation in global capital markets? Few would doubt that
countries with highly developed ﬁnancial systems might well export capital
to other countries. But are there conditions under which having such a sys-
tem might also promote imports of capital? These are the broad questions
that motivate our paper.
To address the questions and attempt to answer them, we draw on in-
sights from two bodies of research that have developed independently of
one another, but that in our view are quite related. One includes the work of
economic historians on the development of ﬁnancial systems—especially
banking systems—in various countries, and the impact of ﬁnancial devel-
opments on economic growth within those countries. Also included in this
historical work is a vast body of literature on aspects of globalization: cross-
border ﬁnancing and capital ﬂows, international banking and ﬁnancial
crises, and the integration of the world’s money and capital markets.
Among economic historians, these two strands of literature, one dealing
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helpful comments and suggestions.ways related to one another. Both, however, are elements of the story of ﬁ-
nancial globalization.
The other body of research on which we draw is the work of contempo-
rary economists on the relationship between measures of ﬁnancial devel-
opment and such variables as the growth of real per capita income and in-
vestment. Typically these are cross-country analyses based on models of the
ﬁnance-growth nexus for the postwar period, when broadly consistent data
for a large number of countries at varying levels of economic development
became available. They are the economists’ equivalent of the economic his-
torians’ comparative studies of national ﬁnancial and banking systems and
their relationship to economic growth. They do not say much about ﬁnan-
cial globalization.
Our goal here is to integrate and extend these two bodies of existing re-
search, the historical and the economic, in a longer-term investigation of ﬁ-
nancial globalization during the past two centuries. Our operating hypoth-
esis is that countries with well-functioning ﬁnancial systems have one of the
conditions, perhaps a key one, conducive to economic growthand alsoa set
of institutions that give conﬁdence to foreign investors and thus promote ﬁ-
nancial globalization by allocating the world’s capital more eﬃciently.
We  begin with a discussion of what we mean by a good or well-
functioning ﬁnancial system (section 8.1). Next (section 8.2) we develop
several historical case studies of countries that built such systems early in
their modern economic histories: the Netherlands, Great Britain, the
United States, France, Germany, and Japan. For each case, we consider
when and how a modern ﬁnancial system emerged, how it contributed to
economic growth, and what relationship it had to the country’s participa-
tion in international ﬁnance. With some lessons of ﬁnancial history drawn
from the cases in mind, we then investigate, in the context of a larger set of
countries for which we have data covering the period from the middle of the
nineteenth century to the present, the ﬁnance-growth nexus, and the ﬁ-
nance-growth-globalization nexus. This one-and-a-half-century period en-
compasses two eras of economic globalization that others have identiﬁed,
that of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and that of the late
twentieth century extending now into the twenty-ﬁrst century. After dis-
cussing data sources and methodological considerations (section 8.3), we
present and discuss our econometric results (section 8.4), and conclude
(section 8.5).
8.1 What is a Good Financial System?
History appears to indicate that a good ﬁnancial system is one that has
ﬁve key components. These components are (a) sound public ﬁnances and
public debt management; (b) stable monetary arrangements; (c) a variety of
banks, some with domestic and others with international orientations, and
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tic ﬁnances and manage international ﬁnancial relations; and (e) well-
functioning securities markets.1 Such an articulated ﬁnancial system, once
it is in place and functioning, can mobilize capital domestically and thereby
promote a country’s economic development and growth. In a ﬁnancial
globalization context, it can also serve, either directly by the facilities it
oﬀers or indirectly by enhancing growth prospects, to attract the interest of
foreign investors.
To place our vantage point here in perspective, we make two comments.
First, academic specialization being what it is, contemporary scholars and
those of previous generations often focus their attention on one or a subset
of the components. Some economists are public ﬁnance experts, whereas
others study money, banking, and central banking. Securities markets
and company ﬁnance are usually the provinces of ﬁnance departments in
business schools. Even economic historians, who often take a longer and
broader view of economic development than economists and ﬁnance spe-
cialists, tend to concentrate on one component—usually banking—or a
subset of them. Our view is that in a well-functioning ﬁnancial system, there
are numerous interactions among all of our ﬁve components. Hence, we
think that the unit of observation for studying ﬁnance’s role in economic
modernization should be the ﬁnancial system as a whole, and not just one
or two of its components.
Second, whenever one peels back the layers of the great onion of history
and stops at a layer that seems important for later developments, the ques-
tion inevitably arises, “But what made that layer possible?” In our case,
what makes a good ﬁnancial system possible? What are its prerequisites?
Without going into detail, we would say that the prerequisites would likely
include a combination of good government, including representative polit-
ical institutions, an independent judiciary or court system, clearly deﬁned
and secure property rights, and ﬁnancial savvy on the part of leaders—ﬁ-
nance ministers, central bankers, and so on—among the components of a
good system.
We place sound public ﬁnance ﬁrst in our list of ﬁnancial-system compo-
nents largely for historical reasons. In modern history, good ﬁnancial sys-
tems emerged out of the needs of the nation-state for ﬁnancing, often to
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1. Insurance might well be added to our list, as a sixth component. We leave it out here, in
part because it involves a function—risk management—similar to that in which another com-
ponent, banking, engages, and in part because, in a global historical context, it could be and
often was supplied by insurers in other countries. Nonetheless, we recognize that the leading
economies to be discussed in section 8.2 did develop the insurance component of their ﬁnan-
cial systems early in their ﬁnancial and economic modernizations. Insurance is a ﬁnancial
product, and insurance companies invested the premiums they received in other ﬁnancial as-
sets such as securities. In the context of modern ﬁnancial systems, it may be useful to think of
the bank as the paragon of the institutional lender and the insurance company as the paragon
of the institutional investor.ﬁght its wars with other nation-states.2 Sound public ﬁnance includes set-
ting and controlling public expenditure priorities, raising revenues ade-
quate to fund them eﬃciently, and if—as is often the case—that involves is-
suing public debt, then provision must be made for servicing the debt to
gain and keep the conﬁdence of the investors who purchase it.
The historical primacy of public ﬁnance in the development of ﬁnancial
systems, to be documented below, serves another purpose. It reminds us
that much of ﬁnance, historically and now, and especially when ﬁnance has
global dimensions, is inextricably bound up with politics. It is both naive
and a misreading of history to assume that capital moved throughout the
world solely, or even mostly, in search of the highest available return com-
mensurate with the risks taken. It is equally naive to assume that capital
usually moved in response to the demands of users who wanted to make
productive economic investments. In a world without governments and
foreign policies, that might have been the case. But ours is not such a world.
This is a reality that needs to be kept in mind in any discussion of economic
globalization. Nonetheless, it should also be kept in mind that the needs of
governments to raise and deploy funds internationally for reasons of state
(typically, wars) resulted in the creation of ﬁnancial systems that could mo-
bilize capital and deploy it for productive economic purposes (Ferguson
2001).
Stable money is desirable for the usual textbook reasons. Money is useful
as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a standard of deferred pay-
ments. All three uses, but especially the latter two, are harmed if money ﬂuc-
tuates and depreciates in value in unpredictable ways. Banks and banking
have played large roles in modern economies. Once a monetary base is spec-
iﬁed, banks of deposit, discount, and note issue amplify it into a money
stock that consists largely of bank money convertible into the monetary
base. They do this by granting credit to entrepreneurs and other users of
funds. The credit-granting function turns banks into risk managers, the
essence of their role as ﬁnancial intermediaries. A lot of the risk that banks
manage arises from borrowing short and lending long. Individual banks
and banking systems become troubled, even fail, when recipients of bank
credit are unwilling or unable to repay on schedule (illiquidity and default
problems) or at all (insolvency and repudiation problems). If depositors, the
holders of bank money from whom the banks borrow short, learn of such
problems, they may compound them by attempting en masse to convert
their bank money to base money.
Central banks, the fourth of our key components of a modern ﬁnancial
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2. Unless one subscribes to an economic theory of war, the importance of war in shaping ﬁ-
nancial systems in modern history argues for treating the origins of modern ﬁnancial systems
as economically exogenous rather than endogenous. Later in the chapter, we discuss the debate
between those who say real-sector economic changes lead to ﬁnancial-developmental re-
sponses and those who, like us, would give more primacy to ﬁnancial development as leading
to real-sector development.system, can prevent such problems from arising, or at least alleviate them
when they do arise. They do this by monitoring and regulating the opera-
tions of individual banks in a banking system with the goal of preventing
problems. And they do it to alleviate problems when they do arise by acting
as lenders of last resort. Central banks also act in the areas of other ﬁnan-
cial-system components. For example, they often serve as the government’s
bank—that is, as an adjunct of public ﬁnance. And they act to stabilize the
value of a country’s money, both domestically and internationally.
Securities markets, the last component, facilitate the issuance of public
and private debt securities and private equity securities. Specialized
banks—investment or merchant banks—serve here as ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries between the borrowers/issuers (governments and business enterprises)
of bonds, stocks, and other forms of securities, and the lenders/investors
who purchase securities. Once securities are issued, trading markets provide
them with transferability and liquidity that enhance their appeal to in-
vestors, be they domestic or foreign.
One could arrive at the above list of key ﬁnancial-system components as
an inference from observing the ﬁnancial systems of highly developed na-
tional economies today. Such ﬁnancial systems are one of the characteris-
tics of these countries that distinguish them from the far larger number of
less developed economies. In that connection, our chapter relates to that of
Bordo and Flandreau (ch. 9 in this volume). They argue that core countries
with developed economies and mature ﬁnancial systems, including the wide
and deep ﬁnancial markets as well as sound ﬁscal and monetary arrange-
ments that are among the components we identify, are now able to function
within a framework of ﬂexible exchange rates between countries. In con-
trast, peripheral developing economies with immature ﬁnancial systems
have a well-justiﬁed “fear of ﬂoating” and therefore often ﬁnd it useful, in
order to access international capital markets, to anchor their currencies to
those of core countries.
Our chapter also is related to that of Obstfeld and Taylor (ch. 3 in this vol-
ume). They ﬁnd, for example, that in the globalization of a century and
more ago capital ﬂowed more freely from the core countries to the periph-
ery than it has in the more recent revival of capital-market globalization.
Now core countries invest relatively more of the total international ﬂow of
capital in each other and relatively less in the periphery than they did a cen-
tury ago. In our view, this illustrates the importance of mature national ﬁ-
nancial systems in attracting capital from foreign investors, and the disad-
vantages of immature systems in doing the same. A century ago, as Obstfeld
and Taylor hint, many of the periphery countries were parts of core-country
empires. Therefore, the immaturity of their domestic ﬁnancial systems,
which were overseen by imperial authorities, mattered less than it does in
today’s world of independent nations.
We turn now to a more detailed account of the historical origins of mod-
ern, mature ﬁnancial systems.
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The foregoing discussion of a good ﬁnancial system in terms of its key
components and their connections to one another raises several questions.
When, where, and how did such articulated ﬁnancial systems appear in
modern economic history? And did it matter for the countries concerned in
terms of their economic growth and their participation and status in the
world economy?
Our reading of modern economic history is that countries that developed
such good ﬁnancial systems early in their histories grew rapidly thereafter
and often attracted foreign capital inﬂows that served to enhance their
growth. The Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States are leading
examples. In succession, these three countries after their ﬁnancial emer-
gence went on to become the economic leaders of the past four centuries
and also leaders in the export of capital.
The Dutch Republic was the ﬁrst country to develop such a system, early
in the seventeenth century. Despite its small size, the country became a lead-
ing political and economic power of the seventeenth century, and its eco-
nomic leadership continued into the eighteenth century.
Great Britain developed such a system at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury and in the ﬁrst decades of the eighteenth century. It went on to have the
ﬁrst industrial revolution later in the century, to build a worldwide empire,
and to succeed the Dutch Republic as the leading world economy during
the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth century.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the newly independent United
States also developed such a system. It was then a small country on the pe-
riphery of a world system dominated by Europe, with about half a percent
of the world’s population. A century later, with about 5 percent of world
population, the United States had become the world’s largest economy, a
position it maintains after the elapse of another century.
In each of these three cases, ﬁnancial innovation led to economic leader-
ship, and then to the Dutch, the British, and the Americans successively be-
coming world leaders in the export of capital to other countries.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, France and Germany
in Europe, and Japan in Asia also became ﬁnancial innovators, with bene-
ﬁcial results for their economic growth and their ability to become major ex-
porters of capital. In 1914, at the end of the ﬁrst era of globalization, the
four European countries and the United States accounted for about 90 per-
cent of the world’s capital exports. Together with Japan, now the world’s
second largest economy, their share in the second era of globalization at the
end of the twentieth century has not changed much from what it was nine
decades earlier. Even peculiarities of the earlier era remain, with the United
States again—as in 1914—being a net importer of capital even as it exports
a great deal of it.
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tail. There are many similarities among them, but also some diﬀerences.
The United States and Japan are of special interest because their ﬁnancial
revolutions were far separated in time and space from the European home
ground of modern ﬁnance and because they have become the two largest
national economies.
8.2.1 The Dutch Republic
The Republic or United Provinces was born late in the sixteenth century
when the northern provinces of the Spanish Netherlands revolted against
Spanish Habsburg rule and, over several decades of protracted warfare ex-
tending well into the seventeenth century, established independence from
Spain. Even before Dutch independence, provincial governments in the
Spanish Netherlands developed a permanent public debt market, likely the
world’s ﬁrst, when annuities were issued as a means of lightening tax bur-
dens in response to the revenue demands of Spanish overlords (Tracy 1985).
This would now be termed tax smoothing. At roughly the same time, the
Spanish Netherlands perfected a continuing market in negotiable interna-
tional bills of exchange to ﬁnance trade without necessitating large move-
ments of hard money across borders (Van der Wee 1963; Neal 1990).
The Dutch revolt maintained the public-debt and money-market innova-
tions in the United Provinces. When coupled with the new republic’s toler-
ance of minorities in the southern Netherlands, the revolt also led to an in-
ﬂow of both capital and ﬁnancial expertise to Dutch cities, particularly
Amsterdam (De Vries and Woude 1997, 669). In 1609 came two additional
and major ﬁnancial innovations. One was the Wisselbank, or Bank of Am-
sterdam, an exchange bank for merchants and the government whose bank
money was better than gold, or at least better than the motley collection of
gold and silver coins then in circulation. Similar banks were established in
other Dutch cities, as were local private banks (kassiers) and, somewhat
later, merchant banks. The other innovation of 1609 was the common stock,
created when the Dutch East India Company decided to make its capital
permanent and issued dividend-paying, tradable shares to its owners in-
stead of liquidating each of its trading expeditions at its conclusion and dis-
tributing all of the proceeds to the owners. As warfare with Spain wound
down in the early decades of the seventeenth century, and with the aid and
example of Wisselbank money, the Dutch guilder became stable in value
and remained so until the end of the eighteenth century (Neal 1990; Hart,
Jonker, and van Zanden 1997; De Vries and Woude 1997).
Thus, by the early seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic had estab-
lished a version of each of the key components of a modern ﬁnancial sys-
tem: strong public ﬁnances, stable money, banks, a central bank of sorts,
and bond and stock markets. There followed an era of great development
and prosperity variously described as “the ﬁrst modern economy” (De
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riches” (Schama 1988). The republic could not long keep the dominating
political power that by the mid-seventeenth century it had derived from its
strong economy. It was too small a country and too decentralized a state to
accomplish such a feat in a world increasingly dominated by larger, more
centralized states. But Dutch wealth continued to accumulate, Dutch capi-
tal sought returns all over the world, and Dutch ﬁnancial expertise was ex-
ported to other countries.
8.2.2 Great Britain
Dutch expertise in ﬁnance was introduced directly to England after the
Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the Dutch stadhouder, Willem of Or-
ange, was invited to become King William III of England. After generations
of erratic ﬁnancial behavior of previous monarchs, the British, envious of
Dutch economic and ﬁnancial power and hoping to surpass it, passed con-
trol of their country’s ﬁnances and monetary system from the king to Par-
liament.
Adopting Dutch ﬁnance, the British also improved upon it. The Bank of
England was formed in 1694 as a bank of discount, deposit, and note issue
capitalized by public debt, and was thus closer to the modern concept of a
central bank than the Amsterdam Wisselbank. The metallic currency was
recoined, and paper issues such as bank notes were made convertible into
the metallic base. England thus achieved a stable money (Capie 2001a, b).
In subsequent decades the public ﬁnances were also stabilized, in part by
the introduction of standardized perpetual annuities that became the basis
for a liquid public debt market. A domestic money market in bills of ex-
change appeared. Even earlier, the British East India Company followed its
Dutch counterpart by making its capital permanent and issuing tradable
shares against it, and an active equity market in company shares was pres-
ent by the 1690s (Neal 1990; Chancellor 1998). These developments have
been described as an English “ﬁnancial revolution” (Dickson 1967) and as
“the sinews of power” that enabled the British state to win wars and build
an empire (Brewer 1990).
After the mid-eighteenth century, note-issuing country banks began to
dot the English and Welsh countryside, joining the long-existing private
bankers of London and the Bank of England. The banking system was knit
together via the London money market, through which capital surpluses of
English agriculture could be recycled to ﬁnance the capital deﬁcits of areas
industrializing in the ﬁrst industrial revolution (Pressnell 1956). In Scot-
land, large banking co-partnerships with branches and freedom of note is-
sue joined several corporations chartered with banking privileges earlier in
the century (Cameron et al. 1967; Checkland 1975).
Larry Neal’s (1990) study of the eighteenth-century London and Ams-
terdam capital markets documents the manner in which these develop-
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public but also from other continental ﬁnancial centers. Foreign holdings
of shares in leading British companies (East India, South Sea, and the Bank
of England) reached nearly 20 percent of the total by midcentury, and for-
eigners also held about 14 percent of the English national debt. Neal also
demonstrates that the two markets across the North Sea from each other
were  remarkably integrated, with nearly equivalent prices and price
changes for the same securities. Even the famous French and English bub-
bles of 1720 were synchronized in ways that were probably orchestrated by
Dutch investors (Neal 1990, 101–15, 147). At the end of the century, during
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, Neal argues that the abil-
ity of these markets and institutions to transfer ﬂight capital from the con-
tinent to England enabled the industrial revolution there to proceed. Be-
cause of international capital market integration, heavy British government
borrowing to ﬁnance war eﬀorts did not crowd out private investment.
If one is willing to consider northwestern Europe as the world, the eigh-
teenth century surely was the ﬁrst era of ﬁnancial globalization. It was the
result of two modern ﬁnancial systems, most likely the only two such sys-
tems existing then, linking up with each other across the North Sea, to the
advantage of borrowers and investors in both the Dutch Republic and
Great Britain. These systems had a version of each of the ﬁve key compo-
nents of a good ﬁnancial system.
8.2.3 The United States
If one thinks that true ﬁnancial globalization must link continents sepa-
rated perhaps by an ocean, and not merely two countries separated by the
North Sea, history does not stand in the way with much of a delay. That is
because the United States in the early 1790s engineered a ﬁnancial revolu-
tion quite like the earlier ones of the Dutch Republic and Great Britain
(Sylla 1999b). The engineer was Alexander Hamilton, ﬁrst secretary of the
treasury (1789–95) of the new federal government that assembled in 1789
under the Constitution. Hamilton’s earlier writings indicate that he had ab-
sorbed many of the key lessons of Dutch, English, and French ﬁnancial his-
tory. In oﬃce, with the backing of the president, Congress, and the private
sector, he applied them.
First, Hamilton set up a federal revenue collection system based on im-
port tariﬀs and domestic excise taxes authorized by Congress, as well as
hoped-for revenues from land sales that were slow to materialize. While pro-
ceeding with that, Hamilton in 1790 proposed and Congress adopted a plan
for restructuring the par value of the national debt from the American Rev-
olution. The debt included state debts assumed by the new federal govern-
ment and arrears of interest on it that the previous government had been
unable to pay. The restructuring took the form of three new issues of new
federal securities with varying interest rate terms. The new securities were
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revenue system. These provisions applied to the domestic debt of some $65
million; an additional $12 million owed to foreigners, mainly the French
government and Dutch investors, was rolled over with fresh loans from
Dutch bankers (Perkins 1994).
Also in 1790, Hamilton proposed a Bank of the United States modeled on
the Bank of England, but with several innovative features including a large
capital ($10 million), the possibility of branches, and partial (20 percent)
government ownership. Like the Bank of England, it was to be the govern-
ment’s bank and it could also engage in private-sector banking. There were
only three other banks, small state institutions, in the country at the time.
Congress enacted the bank proposal early in 1791. The bank had its initial
public oﬀering in July of that year; it was quickly oversubscribed. The bank
opened in Philadelphia at the end of 1791, and branches were established in
other cities starting in 1792. Fearing that the federal bank with its branches
would dominate U.S. banking, the states moved quickly in the 1790s to char-
ter more banks of their own. A country with no banks prior to 1782 became
one a decade later with a rapidly expanding banking system, and one that
by 1802 had thirty-ﬁve chartered banks (Fenstermaker 1965, 111).
With the bank proposal enacted, Hamilton next produced a report on a
mint, which deﬁned a new U.S. dollar in terms of both gold and silver (i.e.,
a bimetallic monetary base) and proposed establishing a mint to make a va-
riety of coins based on the decimal system, also an innovation, albeit one
earlier proposed by Hamilton’s cabinet colleague, Thomas Jeﬀerson. Ban-
knotes convertible into a specie base gradually replaced the early ﬁat paper
issues of state governments.
The new federal debt securities appeared late in 1790, followed by the
stock of the bank in mid-1791. So many new and putatively high-quality se-
curities energized the informal trading markets of Philadelphia, New York,
and Boston. Trading was vigorous, speculative spirits were unleashed, and
new private issues joined those of the government. Government debts that
had sold at 15 cents on the dollar in 1789 reached par in 1791, and 120 per-
cent of par in early 1792, just before Wall Street’s ﬁrst crash knocked 20 per-
cent oﬀ their value in two months. New York State enacted a law to end
speculation in the streets, causing brokers to meet under a buttonwood tree
in Wall Street in May 1792 and draw up an agreement to trade indoors. This
was the origin of the New York Stock Exchange.
In roughly three years, from 1789 to 1792, the United States was trans-
formed from a bankrupt country with a primitive ﬁnancial system to a
country servicing its debts and equipped with a modern ﬁnancial system
like the ones that the Dutch and the British had developed earlier over many
decades. What were the eﬀects of that system? In keeping with the general
approach of our paper, we discuss them under growth and globalization.
In an earlier paper (Rousseau and Sylla 1999), we analyzed relationships
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Although good data do not become available until late in this period (and
show the U.S. economy growing at modern rates), it is the consensus of eco-
nomic historians that real growth, total and per capita, accelerated over the
six-decade period. Our work developed several annual time series measures
of ﬁnancial development (money stock, bank numbers and capital, and the
number of securities listed in major securities markets), and measures of
real growth and development (investment, imports, and an index of the cu-
mulative stock of business corporations chartered, which we regard as a
measure of entrepreneurial activity). A set of vector autoregressive (VAR)
models indicated that in general causality ran from the ﬁnancial to the real
variables, with an occasional feedback eﬀect of real developments on ﬁ-
nance. These results led us to conjecture that the acceleration of U.S. growth
that occurred in the 1790–1850 period was “ﬁnance led.”
What does “ﬁnance led” mean? The discussion above suggests the possi-
bility that Dutch and British economic growth may also have had roots in
ﬁnancial development. In the Dutch case, a modern ﬁnancial system was in
place before the Golden Age and the rise of the Dutch economy to seven-
teenth-century preeminence. In the British case, a modern ﬁnancial system
was in place before the ﬁrst industrial revolution and the rise of the English
economy to eighteenth-century preeminence. In the U.S. case, a modern ﬁ-
nancial system was in place before the U.S. industrial and transportation
revolutions and the westward movement of the nineteenth century, by the
end of which the United States was the preeminent economy. We see a pat-
tern emerging in this history.
What about globalization? Does having a good ﬁnancial system mean
that foreign capital is more likely to ﬂow to that country? Although residu-
als from balance-of-payments data indicate only modest net capital inﬂows
during the period from 1790 to 1812 (Davis and Cull 1994, 2000), more de-
tailed data on foreign holdings of U.S. securities tell a diﬀerent story. Bench-
mark estimates of such holdings in 1789 and 1803, a period encompassing
the ﬁnancial revolution of the Hamiltonian Federalists, indicate that for-
eign investors increased their holdings by $48–52 million from a 1789 base
of $17–18 million, the majority of which consisted of Revolutionary War
debts owed to France and the Dutch (Wilkins 1989, table 3.1, p. 50). The in-
ﬂow of portfolio capital implied by Wilkins’s data is fairly consistent with
U.S. Treasury and other records for 1803 on total U.S. securities issuance
and the amounts in domestic and foreign hands. Foreign investors held 53
percent of the U.S. national debt in 1803, and 62 percent of the stock of the
Bank of the United States. With shares of state banks, insurance, and trans-
portation companies added in, there was a grand total of $122 million in
public and private securities issued, almost all after 1789 as state chartering
of corporations took oﬀ. Foreign investors held nearly half of these securi-
ties, or $59 million (Sylla, Wilson, and Wright 1997, tables 4 and 5).
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conﬁdence among foreign investors. The ingredients of conﬁdence include
ﬁscally responsible governments, stable money, and sound domestic ﬁnan-
cial institutions, markets, and instruments. Conﬁdence in a country’s secu-
rities increases, we think, when there are domestic stock and bond markets
to enhance their liquidity. Two centuries ago the United States was such an
emerging market, and, with an occasional slip, it has remained a Mecca for
foreign investors ever since. A century earlier, Dutch and other foreign in-
vestors saw something similarly attractive in England. A century before
that, foreign investors saw it in the Dutch Republic. Emerging markets are
not new in history.
8.2.4 France and Germany
After Great Britain, France and Germany were the leading foreign
lenders in the era of globalization during the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. Even then, however, these two large and relatively prosper-
ous European countries lagged well behind Great Britain, another large
country, in international lending, and, on a per capita basis, even behind the
Netherlands. Moreover, the Dutch and the British became foreign lenders
and international investors long before the French and the Germans. This
raises two questions. What accounts for the French and German lag? And
why did the two countries then play major roles in the ﬁnancial globaliza-
tion of the late nineteenth century?
We would answer both questions by saying that until the middle of the
nineteenth century neither France nor Germany had developed all of the
components of a good ﬁnancial system that the Netherlands developed two
centuries earlier, Great Britain a century earlier, and the United States half
a century earlier. In the case of France, while England was having its ﬁnan-
cial revolution in the decades around 1700, the country’s public ﬁnances
were chaotic, and the collapse of John Law’s scheme in 1720 made the
French public suspicious of paper money and banking for a century or
more (White 2001; Murphy 1997). Nonetheless, after the end of the
Napoleonic Wars in 1815, France’s public ﬁnances and currency were sta-
bilized, and the central Bank of France had been present since 1800. There
were also a variety of bankers, but nothing like the extensive banking sys-
tems that existed in the United States and Great Britain. Paris had a stock
exchange, but it listed just a few securities, mostly government debt.
France’s relative ﬁnancial backwardness during the early nineteenth cen-
tury resulted from the state’s strict controls on, and limitations of, banking
and securities market development (Cameron et al. 1967). Kindleberger
(1984, 114–15) provides an extensive list of reasons for concluding that
“France lagged a hundred years behind Britain in money, banking, and ﬁ-
nance....   [T]his was both a reﬂection and a cause of its economic retarda-
tion.” More recent research drawing attention to loan-market substitutes,
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its lag, serves to conﬁrm the country’s relative backwardness in ﬁnancial
development (Hoﬀman, Postel-Vinay, and Rosenthal 2000). The substitutes
gradually gave way to modern forms of ﬁnance in the nineteenth century.
In the case of Germany, the country was of course not uniﬁed in fact un-
til the middle of the nineteenth century, or in law until 1871. When the
United States began its ﬁnancial revolution in 1790, there were hundreds of
separate German states, each with its own ruler. By the early nineteenth
century (if not before), the major German states had stable public ﬁnances
and stable money, but in other ﬁnancial-system components respects they
lagged even behind France. The Prussian Bank, forerunner of the central
Reichsbank that came in 1875, was not founded until 1846. There were a va-
riety of private bankers, including such famous houses as the Rothschilds,
that began in Germany, and other public and private ﬁnancial institutions.
But as in France, state controls limited banking development. Securities
markets were slow to develop, and those of the early decades of the nine-
teenth century were more adjuncts of the private bankers’ businesses than
independent sources of ﬁnance.
In both France and Germany ﬁnancial systems began to take on a more
modern form around 1850. The capital needs of large enterprises such as
railways, and the growing perception that the two countries were lagging
behind Great Britain, provided reasons for change. Change came in more
liberal state approaches to banking development; in particular the innova-
tion (for these countries, although it had existed in the United States for six
to seven decades and in England for two to three decades) was joint-stock
banking. The French leader Louis Bonaparte, after declaring himself Em-
peror Napoleon III in 1851, sought to justify his authoritarian regime by
fostering rapid economic development. With his backing, the joint-stock
Credit Mobilier bank was formed in 1852; it combined commercial and in-
vestment banking. Although the Credit Mobilier failed in 1868, it had an
impact in and outside of France. With the French Credit Mobilier as an ex-
ample, the Germans founded similar institutions (Landes 1965; Cameron et
al. 1967; Born 1983; Kindleberger 1984). During the middle decades of the
nineteenth century, France and Germany thus added missing elements of a
good ﬁnancial system. As their ﬁnancial systems mobilized capital more
eﬀectively, the two economies grew faster and their ﬁnanciers began to in-
vest large sums of capital in other countries.
8.2.5 Japan
Japan until the 1850s was almost totally out of the loop of western eco-
nomic development. Yet it quickly became a major economic and political
power during the era of globalization a century ago, and then within a cen-
tury became the world’s second largest national economy. That makes Japan
perhaps the most interesting of the cases studied here. How did it happen?
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unlike so many of the world’s countries, had a ﬁnancial revolution that re-
sulted in a good ﬁnancial system. After the Meiji revolution toppled the iso-
lationist shogun regime in 1868, there were in the 1870s both bold initiatives
and false starts in building a modern ﬁnancial system. The bold initiative in-
cluded commuting feudal dues paid in rice to government bonds paid in
money. This created a securities market, and the Tokyo and Osaka stock ex-
changes formed in 1878 to trade the new issues. The false starts included ex-
cessive issues of ﬁat currency and an attempt to copy the U.S. national
banking system with bank notes backed by government bonds. The banks
purchased large amounts of government bonds and issued large amounts of
bank notes against them, without much attention to the specie reserves they
were supposed to maintain. Fiat money and bank-created money led to
rampant inﬂation from 1876 to 1881 (Tamaki 1995).
Financially, Japan turned the corner during the 1880s. The Yokohama
Specie Bank was founded in 1880 and given the task of accumulating specie
through ﬁnancing the country’s exports so that a currency convertible to
specie could in time be established. The alternative of gaining specie by
means of a foreign loan was rejected on grounds that foreign lenders could
not be trusted or given inﬂuence in Japanese aﬀairs. The Specie Bank’s op-
erations were clever. It paid Japanese exporters in Japanese currency ad-
vanced from the government when goods were exported, then drew bills of
exchange collectible in specie on the foreign purchasers and collected them
at branches it established in foreign cities, and ﬁnally remitted the specie to
the government to repay the government’s advance (Tamaki 1995; Sylla
1999a). Financial innovation thus encouraged exports and the govern-
ment’s accumulation of specie.
In 1881, Masayoshi Matsukata became Japan’s ﬁnance minister, an oﬃce
he held for many years. Matsukata played a role in Japan’s ﬁnancial revolu-
tion comparable to that of Hamilton in the United States (Rosovsky 1966;
Sylla 1999a). In 1882, he established the central Bank of Japan. He also in-
stituted a regime of ﬁscal austerity and deﬂation to end the inﬂationary ex-
cesses of the 1870s. By 1885, paper money circulation was reduced enough,
and the government’s specie accumulations had increased enough, for the
Bank of Japan to introduce silver-convertible bank notes. Private bank note
issue rights were taken away in 1883, and the government’s ﬁat issues were
gradually retired. Bank of Japan notes were 2 percent of Japan’s note circu-
lation when they were introduced in 1885; by 1897 they had increased to 75
percent. Along with these changes, Matsukata instituted reforms of Japan’s
banking system (Sylla 1999a).
With ﬁscal and currency stability achieved by the mid-1880s, Japan re-
covered quickly from the deﬂation of the decade’s ﬁrst years. Company for-
mation tripled between 1885 and 1890. During a credit crisis in 1889, the
Bank of Japan found a way to aid these companies and the Japanese secu-
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could increase market liquidity by “special discounting” of bills covered by
high-quality public and private securities. The innovation allowed compa-
nies to repay the banks during the credit crunch, and it thus cemented ties
between companies, banks, and the Bank of Japan by encouraging the
banks to hold company shares (Morikawa 1992). Although this might seem
to indicate the origins of modern Japan’s strong bank-ﬁrm relationships, we
now know that securities markets and equity ﬁnance were important inde-
pendent sources of ﬁrm ﬁnancing from the 1880s to the 1920s (Miwa and
Ramseyer 2000a,b, 2001).
In 1897, aided by an indemnity in gold paid by China after the Sino-
Japanese War of 1894–95, Japan adopted the gold standard and started the
system of long-term credit banks. These banks were joint stock companies,
although under the supervision of the ministry of ﬁnance. Issuing deben-
tures, most of which were purchased by the ministry with surplus govern-
ment funds and postal savings deposits, the new banks invested the pro-
ceeds in infrastructure and other investments (Cameron et al. 1967).
Once on the gold standard maintained by the world’s leading economies,
Japan lost its earlier aversion to borrowing abroad and quickly became an
emerging market for foreign investors. Ten Japanese government loans to-
taling more than 80 million British pounds were raised on the London cap-
ital market between 1897 and 1910; a similar total was raised in the markets
of Paris, New York, and Germany in these years (Suzuki 1994; Tamaki
1995). Sussman and Yafeh (2000) show that adoption of the gold standard
dramatically improved the terms on which Japan could borrow in foreign
markets. Our interpretation of this gain is that it was Japan’s ﬁnancial (and
economic) development during the three decades prior to 1897 that made
the adoption of the gold standard possible, and successful.
It is often wondered why, of all the possible candidates, Japan was the one
non-Western country to modernize its economy and join the ranks of the
wealthy Western countries. We think an important part of the answer, and
one supported by Rousseau (1999) with time series evidence, is that early in
its history, during the Meiji era, Japan developed a sophisticated ﬁnancial
system like that of the Western leaders. As in the other cases essayed here,
that ﬁnancial system included stable public ﬁnances, sound money, banks,
a central bank, and securities markets. It enabled Japan, a poor and rela-
tively isolated country in 1870, to become an emerging market and a rapidly
growing economic and political power by the early twentieth century. As
Herbert Feis long ago put it,
Japan, of all the countries of the Orient, proved itself capable of using to
good advantage the capital of Europe. Its government succeeded in the
threefold task of promoting internal industrial development, extending
and reinforcing Japanese economic interests in Korea and China, and ad-
justing its plans to the political rivalries of the European continent....
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better credit risk for investors and a more important ally. By 1914 the
small island empire had become a great power in its own right and might.
(Feis 1965, 429)
Japan had learned an important lesson of history, namely that ﬁnancial
development can be the basis of economic growth and participation as a
major player in the global economy. With all the elements of a good ﬁnan-
cial system in place before the twentieth century, Japan’s economic success
seems less an exception to the rule of West-dominated economic modern-
ization and more a conﬁrmation the key role of ﬁnancial development in
promoting economic modernization.
8.3 Data and Methodology
8.3.1 Overview
In section 8.2, we identify a well-functioning ﬁnancial system as central
to the economic growth of ﬁve Atlantic economies and Japan at various
times over the past three centuries. We next ask whether the available data
support a leading role for ﬁnance in the growth of incomes for a broader set
of countries, and whether ﬁnancial development promoted globalization by
facilitating trade and reducing international dispersion in long-term inter-
est rates. We do this using the cross-country regression framework of Barro
(1991), with the availability of appropriate data over a long historical period
limiting our sample to seventeen countries from 1850 to the present. The
study is to our knowledge the ﬁrst to apply recent cross-country regression
techniques in a systematic study of the ﬁnance-growth nexus that includes
the period before 1960.3 The results, which we describe later, support the
view that ﬁnance aﬀects growth most emphatically in the earlier stages of
economic development. In this respect, they are consistent with Cameron
et al. (1967) and Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), who conducted compara-
tive analyses on smaller sets of countries. We also ﬁnd a role for both ﬁnan-
cial development and trade in reducing interest rates and promoting their
convergence across the Atlantic economies in the pre-1914 period.
Before presenting these ﬁndings, however, we observe that macroeco-
nomic theory has made much progress over the past decade in laying the an-
alytical foundations for scientiﬁc discussion of the ﬁnance-growth nexus.4
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and King and Levine (1993b), for ex-
ample, formulate general equilibrium models in which banks and other ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries arise endogenously to improve the allocation of
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3. This part of our study can thus be viewed as the historical analogue to the cross-country
analysis of King and Levine (1993a).
4. Earlier, more descriptive studies of the relationship between ﬁnancial factors and growth
include, among others, Gurley and Shaw (1955), Goldsmith (1969), and McKinnon (1973).available credit. This so-called total factor productivity (or TFP) channel
thus operates through the selection and funding of projects with high
private and social returns. Other models, such as those of Bencivenga and
Smith (1991) and Rousseau (1998), emphasize “debt accumulation” or the
ability of a well-functioning ﬁnancial system to mobilize resources for proj-
ects that would otherwise have remained in the drawer. Empirical investi-
gations, including Levine and Zervos (1998) and Bell and Rousseau (2001),
oﬀer evidence on the TFP and debt accumulation channels, respectively,
with the latter suggesting accumulation as even a precondition for improved
allocation in developing countries. If this is indeed the case, the conﬁdence
of potential market participants, as enhanced by the ﬁrst four characteris-
tics of a good ﬁnancial system that we describe in section 8.2, is critical to
achieving a threshold level of lending activity from which a fuller menu of
ﬁnancial institutions can emerge.
Our study does not distinguish empirically between these complemen-
tary yet distinct channels of ﬁnance-led growth due to the limited nature of
measures of ﬁnancial development that are available over the past century
and a half for the broad set of countries that we consider. Since emerging ﬁ-
nancial institutions are likely to have aﬀected both the accumulation and
the allocation of resources in the economies that we study, however, we do
not view our joint tests for both channels as particularly limiting.
Finance, some would argue, perhaps should not be considered a truly ex-
ogenous component in the growth process. Indeed, the consensus view of
economists some ﬁfty years ago, and which to some degree persists, can be
summarized by Joan Robinson’s (1952) assertion that “By and large, . . .
where enterprise leads, ﬁnance follows.” In the long run, increases in eco-
nomic activity will undoubtedly generate demand for ﬁnancial services and
lead to a larger intermediating sector. This channel might be important in
the later stages of development when ﬁnancial systems have matured, and
possibly in providing one of the impulses needed to develop a ﬁnancial sys-
tem in the ﬁrst place.5In contrast, the TFP and debt accumulation channels
are likely to operate most emphatically in the early to middle stages of a
country’s economic modernization, with the TFP channel retaining impor-
tance as the economy matures. In the formal analysis, we will address the
endogeneity of ﬁnancial institutions by using instruments and predeter-
mined variables in our cross-country regression models.
8.3.2 The Data
To  study relationships between the ﬁnancial and real sectors, we ﬁrst
identify measures of ﬁnancial development, outward orientation, and real-
sector performance that can be constructed with the available historical
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5. Our historical survey of ﬁnancial system development in section 8.2 indicates that the pol-
itics of war, if anything, was more important than the economics of enterprise and growth as
an impulse for ﬁnancial modernization.data. To this end, we build a panel using annual data for 1850–1997 from
three main sources. From 1960, we use the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators database. For earlier years we use data from worksheets
underlying Bordo and Jonung (1987, 2001) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2000),
and supplement with ﬁnancial, trade, and public-sector aggregates from
Mitchell’s (1998a-c) volumes of International Historical Statistics. The re-
sulting data set includes seventeen countries. The appendix describes the
sources in detail.
Table 8.1 lists the seventeen countries along with their average annual
growth rates of real per capita income and ﬁnancial depth (as measured by
the ratio of the broadest available monetary aggregate to output) for the
1850–89, 1890–1929, and 1945–94 periods.6It also includes the level of real
per capita income measured in 1960 U.S. dollars at the midpoints of these
periods (i.e., 1870, 1910, and 1970).7 The remarkable feature of the table is
the growth in the ratios of the broad money stock to gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) in all but three of the seventeen economies between the 1850–89
and 1890–1929 periods, with the ratio rising by more than 50 percent in
nine of the countries. In contrast, ﬁnancial depth grew in only ten of our
countries between the 1890–1929 and 1945–94 periods, and only three
countries experienced growth in the ratio of more than 50 percent.
Bordo and Jonung (1987) examine the behavior of the velocity of circu-
lation, which is roughly the inverse of our measure of ﬁnancial depth, for
ﬁve of the countries in our study (Canada, Norway, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States) and observe a U-shaped pattern from
1870 to 1975.8 They then show that the downward portion of the U-curve
can be explained by ﬁnancial development in the form of monetization, as
measured by the changes in the agricultural/industrial mix of the economy
and the ratio of ﬁnancial assets to total assets, and that the upward portion
may reﬂect an availability of substitutes for money as an asset. The evidence
in table 8.1 is consistent with this interpretation for our broader sample in
the pre-1930 period. The ratio of the money stock to output may thus be a
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6. The starting years of the averages that appear in table 8.1 under the column headings
“1850–1889” are as follows: Argentina, 1884; Australia GDP growth, 1870; Australia money/
GDP, 1880; Brazil, 1880; Canada, 1870; Denmark, 1850; Finland, 1860; France, 1850; Ger-
many, 1850; Italy GDP growth, 1862; Italy money/GDP, 1872; Japan, 1878; the Netherlands,
1850; Norway, 1865; Portugal, 1880; Sweden GDP growth, 1861; Spain GDP growth, 1858;
Spain money/GDP, 1875; Sweden money/GDP, 1870; United Kingdom GDP growth, 1850;
United Kingdom money/GDP, 1870; United States, 1850. Data from 1914–24 and 1945–48
are unavailable for Germany and thus are not included in the relevant averages. The same ap-
plies to France for 1914–20 and 1945–48.
7. When computing output growth rates, we use GDP in real local currency units. When
computing levels in 1960 U.S. dollars, we use the U.S. dollar equivalents from the World De-
velopment Indicators database for 1960–1997. For earlier years, we use oﬃcial exchange rates
to convert local currency output into U.S. dollars and then deﬂate the result using the U.S. im-
plicit price deﬂator.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.particularly useful proxy for ﬁnancial development in the earlier decades of
our study in that it reﬂects industrialization as well as an increased use of ﬁ-
nancial assets.
Turning to the potential real eﬀects of ﬁnance, for which we are most in-
terested, we observe that among the nine countries in table 8.1 that saw ﬁ-
nancial depth rise by 50 percent or more, six of them saw real per capita
GDP also rise by more than 50 percent. Interestingly, all three of the coun-
tries that saw ﬁnancial depth rise by more than 50 percent in the postwar
period also had income growth of more than 50 percent. The data thus in-
dicate wide disparities in the growth experiences of the economies in our
sample but also suggest a correlation between ﬁnancial depth and real in-
comes. We now proceed to investigate these relationships more formally.
8.3.3 Methodology
Our examination of links between ﬁnancial development, trade, and in-
come focuses on the broad implications that can arise in a cross-country
framework. This type of analysis has become a near tradition in the empir-
ical study of growth and its determinants since Barro (1991) isolated key
variables, such as education and political stability, as members of a bench-
mark set of robust correlates. Given that most studies of ﬁnancial factors in
growth are extensions of this framework (see, e.g., King and Levine 1993a
and Levine and Zervos 1998), we begin by exploring partial correlations be-
tween growth and the ratios of broadly deﬁned money and international
trade to output from 1850 to the present and over two subperiods covering
1850–1929 and 1945–94.
The ratio of the liquid liabilities to output is a common measure of the
size and possibly the sophistication of the ﬁnancial sector in an individual
country, yet it is imprecise because of nonbank intermediaries such as in-
surance and investment companies, whose liabilities do not wind up in the
broad money aggregate. These omissions are likely to be far less important
in the prewar period, but quite substantial in recent years. Further, a ﬁnan-
cial system should be characterized by all of the institutions that promote
the accumulation of capital, including securities markets. Rousseau and
Sylla (1999) show that securities markets played an important role in early
U.S. growth presumably because they attracted foreign capital, whereas
Levine and Zervos (1998) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) present evi-
dence of their importance in cross-country models that use recent data. Un-
fortunately, we do not yet know the extent of securities market development
in the prewar period for most of the countries in our sample, and so to con-
duct an analysis that allows for consistent comparisons across time periods
we must for now be satisﬁed with the ratio of broad money to GDP.
A reasonable way to measure economic performance is through growth
in real per capita incomes. Although such a measure ignores the impact of
the distribution of income on welfare, it nevertheless provides a convenient
summary of economic conditions in a given country and has the important
392 Peter L. Rousseau and Richard Syllaadvantage of being readily available for a fairly large set of countries as far
back as the mid-nineteenth century. We use it here as the primary measure
of economic outcomes.
Measures of economic “globalization” are even more diﬃcult to identify
for a large set of countries. It is clear, however, that the degree to which a
country has an “outward orientation” is related to the extent of its integra-
tion with other markets, and trade data are readily available for most of the
counties in our sample—in most cases even farther back in time than out-
put. To participate in trade arrangements, short-term ﬁnance is critical, and
much of this ﬁnancing is provided through the banking sector in the form
of credits and acceptances. When seen in this light, banks can contribute to
economic globalization by providing the credits needed to promote trade.
To  examine the importance of these eﬀects, we also consider models in
which the ratio of trade (the sum of imports and exports) to GDP enters ei-
ther as a regressor or as the dependent variable.
Existing empirical studies of the relationship between trade and growth
have reached mixed conclusions, presumably because most measures of
openness are themselves endogenous and inﬂuenced by nonpolicy factors
(see Edwards 1998 for a useful survey). This has led to sensitivity of trade
eﬀects in cross-country regressions to the choice of conditioning variables.
Frankel and Romer (1999) have recently shown, however, that geographic
characteristics are good instruments for isolating the impact of the prede-
termined component of trade on the level of real income, and that this eﬀect
is large but not always signiﬁcant statistically. Such an eﬀect is likely to be
more elusive in our study, where the focus is on growth rather than levels.
We nevertheless attempt to extract the predetermined component of the ra-
tio of trade to output with instruments and then examine its explanatory
power when added to our cross-country speciﬁcations.
The tendency for real interest rates to converge in the Atlantic economies
before 1914 and again more recently is documented by Obstfeld and Taylor
(1998) and has been interpreted by them as an indicator of the extent of eco-
nomic integration. What remains unstudied is the role of ﬁnancial institu-
tions, and primarily banks, in promoting interest rate convergence. Since
Homer and Sylla (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2000) together make an-
nual interest rate series for long-term debt available for twelve of the coun-
tries in our study well into the nineteenth century, we conclude by exam-
ining the roles of ﬁnance and trade in the process of convergence in the
pre-1914 period.
8.4 Results and Discussion
8.4.1 Finance, Trade, and Growth
Our ﬁrst set of speciﬁcations uses decadal average growth rates of real
per capita GDP from 1850 to 1997 as the dependent variable and conditions
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each decade.9 The “convergence” or “catch-up” eﬀect, as manifested by a
negative sign for the coeﬃcient on initial income, has been shown to be
quite strong in cross-country regressions for the post-1960 period. By in-
cluding initial income in our baseline speciﬁcation, we can determine if it is
important in the pre-Depression period as well. Placing the ratio of broad
money to GDP on the right-hand side allows us to evaluate the role, if any,
that ﬁnance plays in the conditional growth process. Since the levels vari-
ables are trending in nature and we would like to control for other business-
cycle related eﬀects, we include (but do not report coeﬃcients on) dummy
variables for each decade.
Table 8.2presents the regressions, which use the ﬁrst observations of each
decade as regressors to ameliorate the impact of possible reverse causality
from growth to additional ﬁnance. This technique cannot fully eliminate
the simultaneity problem due to autocorrelation in the time series for ﬁ-
nancial depth, but it does ensure that all regressors are predetermined and
thus plausible determinants of subsequentgrowth. The ﬁrst column of table
8.2 presents our baseline, which includes only initial income, ﬁnancial
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9. We compute a “decadal” average for a country in any decade for which observations are
available for seven or more years. When we divide the sample and work with ﬁve-year subpe-
riods, observations must be available in at least three years before we compute a ﬁve-year av-
erage.
Table 8.2 Cross-Country OLS Growth Regressions, 1850–1997
Dependent Variable: % Growth of Per Capita Real GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 6.113** 6.279** 7.463** 7.542**
(1.434) (1.471) (1.500) (1.507)
Log of initial real per capita GDP –0.672** –0.699* –0.706** –0.718**
(0.178) (0.183) (0.179) (0.180)
Initial ratio of broad money to GDP 1.293** 1.245** 0.949* 0.899*
(0.557) (0.567) (0.541) (0.547)
Initial ratio of trade to GDP 0.161 0.213
(0.330) (0.318)
Initial ratio of government  –5.280** –5.591**
expenditure to GDP (2.299) (2.349)
R2 0.336 0.339 0.359 0.361
N 214 211 200 200
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses. The de-
pendent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP averaged for each decade from 1850 to the
1990s. Initial values are taken from the ﬁrst year of each decade. Decade dummies are included in the re-
gression but are not reported.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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Table 8.3 Cross-Country Instrumental Variables Growth Regressions, 1850–1997
Dependent Variable: % Growth of Per Capita Real GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 6.424** 6.427** 6.776** 6.821**
(1.457) (1.462) (1.477) (1.985)
Log of initial real per capita GDP –0.697** –0.700** –0.603** –0.610**
(0.179) (0.180) (0.179) (0.180)
Ratio of broad money to GDP 1.056** 1.042** 0.956* 0.903*
(0.542) (0.549) (0.540) (0.548)
Ratio of trade to GDP 0.071 0.234
(0.364) (0.368)
Ratio of government  –5.915** –6.286**
expenditure to GDP (2.583) (2.658)
R2 0.355 0.355 0.372 0.370
N 199 199 197 197
Notes: The table reports coeﬃcients from two-stage least squares regressions with standard errors in
parentheses. All data items are decadal averages covering the 1850s through the 1990s. Instruments in-
clude initial values of the full set of regressors as well as the inﬂation rate, with initial values taken as the
ﬁrst observation of each decade. Decade dummies are included in all regressions but are not reported.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
depth, and time eﬀects on the right-hand side, while columns (2)–(4) report
results for speciﬁcations with the ratios of international trade and/or gov-
ernment expenditure to GDP as additional conditioning variables. We in-
clude the ratio of trade to output to control for direct eﬀects of international
trade on growth that do not operate indirectly through ﬁnance. We include
the government expenditure variable because it is likely that the resource re-
quirements associated with large public expenditure crowd out private in-
vestment and lead to less eﬃcient resource allocations than the private sec-
tor might be able to provide.
A strong convergence eﬀect, as indicated by negative and signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients on initial income, and a positive and signiﬁcant role of ﬁnancial
depth in subsequent growth are common to all four regressions that we re-
port in table 8.2. When included with ﬁnancial depth on the right-hand side,
trade is not signiﬁcant, and government expenditure, as expected, is nega-
tive and signiﬁcant. The inclusion of the conditioning variables in equations
(2)–(4) tends to reduce the measured eﬀect of ﬁnance on growth, yet signif-
icance of the broad ﬁnancial aggregate persists. The R2from the regressions
suggests that a large portion of the cross-sectional variation in output
growth can be explained by our simple models.
Table 8.3 presents a similar set of speciﬁcations, but instead of using ini-
tial values of the data in each period as regressors, we use contemporane-
ous averages and control for simultaneity with instruments. By includingthe initial values of the complete set of regressors as well as initial inﬂation
as instruments, these two-stage least squares regressions extract the prede-
termined (i.e., explainable through information in the initial information set
for each period) components of the right-hand-side variables and use them
in place of the actual regressors in the estimation. This alternative yields re-
sults that are quantitatively very similar to those presented in table 8.2. As
a group, the regressions reported in tables 8.2 and 8.3 are thus consistent
with a leading role for ﬁnancial factors in growth for our seventeen-country
sample over a 150-year period.10
Tables 8.4 and 8.5 evaluate the robustness of the ordinary least squares
(OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) results in subperiods covering 1850–
1929 and 1945–94. To make more observations available for each estima-
tion, we work with ﬁve-year rather than decadal averages of the data. In the
pre-1929 period, we note again the signiﬁcance of the convergence and ﬁ-
nance eﬀects on growth and the robustness of the results to the choice of es-
timation technique. Government expenditure remains negative but less sig-
niﬁcant in the pre-Depression period, perhaps because the government, in
the absence of a less sophisticated ﬁnancial system, must play a more cen-
tral role in delivering resources to productive projects.
A less prominent role for ﬁnance in the postwar period is the striking fea-
ture of table 8.5. Financial depth retains signiﬁcance when appearing alone
on the right-hand side, but this eﬀect vanishes when trade is included in the
regressions either explicitly or in the instrument set. King and Levine
(1993a) ﬁnd the eﬀects of ﬁnance on growth robust to the inclusion of trade
using post-1960 data for a wider group of industrialized and emerging
economies, and that the trade variable itself is not statistically signiﬁcant.
We attribute this diﬀerence to the industrialized nature of nearly all of the
countries in our sample by 1960. Indeed, the rise of money substitutes in
more mature economies weakens the eﬀectiveness of broad money to GDP
as a measure of ﬁnancial sophistication.
It is diﬃcult to draw strong conclusions about the nonrobustness of the
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10. Our ﬁndings are consistent with growth being “ﬁnance-led” but do not preclude the pos-
sibility that growth may also be promoting further ﬁnancial development. In fact, when we
momentarily set the relevant growth theory aside by moving ﬁnance to the left-hand side of
our regressions and placing the growth rate of output on the right, we ﬁnd that output growth
enters with a positive and signiﬁcant sign in the pre-1930 period, though not over the full
sample or in the postwar period. This result is consistent with, though not overwhelmingly
supportive of, the priors of generations of economists who have stressed what we would call
“reverse causality” in the ﬁnance-growth nexus. Indeed, in time series analyses of ﬁve coun-
tries in our sample (Canada, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
from 1870 to 1929, Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) do not ﬁnd a role for growth in promoting
additional ﬁnance in the short to medium term. Our main cross-sectional results, which reduce
simultaneity problems by using initial values of ﬁnance as regressors in OLS speciﬁcations and
as instruments in IV speciﬁcations, are meant to suggest that ﬁnance plays an important lead-
ing role in the growth process—a role that is likely to be central.result of ﬁnancial development on growth in the postwar period once trade
is added to the speciﬁcation or the instrument set due to potential problems
of collinearity between trade and the other regressors. For example, it is also
possible that the trade aggregate in recent decades has proxied for a concept
much broader than trading volume, namely the degree to which an econ-
omy is integrated internationally. In mature economies, a banking system,
which is the essence of our ﬁnancial development measure, may be a less im-
portant factor in such integration.
We move toward disentangling these eﬀects by exploring the degree to
which ﬁnance aﬀects trading volume across sample periods in table 8.6. In
these regressions, the ratio of trade to output serves as dependent variable,
and we again control for initial income. The ﬁnancial variables are signiﬁ-
cant over the full sample and the 1850–1929 period but are not signiﬁcant in
the postwar period. These results suggest that ﬁnancial systems do play a
role in promoting trade in the earlier stages of ﬁnancial and economic devel-
opment. To the extent that trade in turn also promoted growth, ﬁnance may
be even more important to long-run growth than our regressions suggest.
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Table 8.4 Cross-Country Growth Regressions, 1850–1929
Dependent Variable: % Growth of Per Capita Real GDP
OLS (initial values) IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.829** 6.506** 4.804** 6.342**
(1.728) (2.060) (1.821) (2.059)
Log of initial real per capita GDP –0.587** –0.755** –0.568* –0.737**
(0.275) (0.311) (0.289) (0.307)
Ratio of broad money to GDP 2.593** 2.158* 2.273** 2.113*
(1.067) (1.104) (1.048) (1.070)
Ratio of trade to GDP 0.113 0.120
(0.386) (0.403)
Ratio of government  –6.713* –6.595
expenditure to GDP (3.919) (4.216)
R2 0.136 0.136 0.124 0.147
N 208 185 185 185
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP averaged for each ﬁve-year pe-
riod from 1850–54 through 1925–29. Initial values are taken from the ﬁrst year of each ﬁve-year period.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Period dummies are included in the regressions but not re-
ported. The left panel of the table reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from OLS regressions using ini-
tial values as regressors. The right panel reports coeﬃcients and standard errors from two-stage least
squares regressions. The IV regressions use the ﬁve-year averages of the data as regressors. Instruments
include initial values of the full set of regressors as well as the inﬂation rate.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.Table 8.5 Cross-Country Growth Regressions, 1945–94
Dependent Variable: % Growth of Per Capita Real GDP
OLS (initial values) IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 9.941** 9.275** 10.064** 9.366**
(2.316) (1.821) (1.738) (1.861)
Log of initial real per capita GDP –1.404** –0.968** –1.153** –0.961**
(0.283) (0.247) (0.211) (0.269)
Ratio of liquid liabilities (M3) to GDP 3.570** 0.372 0.321 0.299
(0.663) (0.591) (0.578) (0.587)
Ratio of trade to GDP –0.089 –0.045
(0.723) (0.765)
Ratio of government –3.794 –4.348 
expenditure to GDP (2.860) (4.108)
R2 0.416 0.370 0.362 0.361
N 166 162 162 162
Notes: See notes for table 8.4. The dependent variable is the growth rate of real per capita GDP averaged
for each ﬁve-year period from 1945–49 through 1990–94.
Table 8.6 Cross-Country Trade Regressions
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Trade to GDP
OLS 1850–1997 IV 1850–1997 IV 1850–1929 IV 1945–94
Constant –0.077 –0.054 0.100 –0.102
(0.291) (0.316) (0.360) (0.203)
Log of initial real per  0.050 0.049 0.004 0.064**
capita GDP (0.036) (0.039) (0.057) (0.025)
Ratio of broad money  0.247** 0.214* 0.605** 0.096
to GDP (0.111) (0.118) (0.207) (0.071)
R2 0.100 0.093 0.055 0.128
N 211 199 185 164
Notes:The dependent variable is ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to gross domestic product averaged
for decades from the 1850s through the 1990s (cols. [1] and [2]) and for ﬁve-year periods for 1850–1929
(col. [3]) and 1945–94 (col. [4]). Initial values are from the ﬁrst year of each period. Period dummies are
included in the regressions but not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. The ﬁrst column reports
results from OLS regressions that use initial values as regressors. The others report results from two-stage
least squares regressions that use the periodic data averages as regressors. Instruments include initial val-
ues of the ratio of government expenditure to output, the inﬂation rate, and the full set of regressors.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
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Fig. 8.1 Nominal interest rates, 1850–1914
Sources: Homer and Sylla (1996) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
8.4.2 Finance and Interest-Rate Convergence
In this section, we examine the possible roles of ﬁnance and international
trade in promoting the decline and convergence of long-term interest rates
among the economies in our sample over the 1850–1914 period. Figure
8.1, which presents nominal interest rates for ten of the truly “Atlantic”
economies in our sample, indicates that decline and convergence is indeed
the general pattern of long-term rates.11 The convergence is most striking
among the European and North American countries, whose capital ﬂows
as a share of GDP over this period exceeded those achieved at any point in
the postwar period,12and for which ﬁnancial deepening over the period was
particularly vigorous. To examine more explicitly whether these factors
contributed importantly to the pattern in ﬁgure 8.1, we turn again to cross-
country regression analysis.
In our ﬁrst speciﬁcation, for which we report results in table 8.7, the de-
pendent variable is the nominal interest rate averaged over ﬁve-year periods
for each country. Such a regression allows us to test for the role of ﬁnance
and openness in one of the characteristics that is clear from ﬁgure 8.1,
namely the decline in interest rates. To control for Fisher-type eﬀects, we in-
clude current period inﬂation on the right-hand side. Since economic the-
11. Figure 8.1 includes interest rates for ten countries, including Argentina 1884–1913,
Brazil 1899–1912, Canada 1870–1914, Germany 1870–1914, France 1850–1914, Italy 1880–
1914, the Netherlands 1850–1914, Sweden 1880–1914, the United Kingdom 1850–1914, and
the United States 1857–1914.
12. See Obstfeld and Taylor (1998, 359–60).ory also suggests a long-run link between the growth rate of the economy
and the real rate of interest, we include, as in cross-country growth regres-
sions, the initial log level of per capita real GDP on the right-hand side. The
left panel of table 8.7 presents regression results for all twelve countries for
which we have interest rate data (i.e., the ten countries from ﬁgure 8.1 plus
Japan and Australia), while the right panel excludes the non-“Atlantic”
economies. We use initial values of ﬁnancial development as regressors for
the OLS regressions, and contemporaneous averages of ﬁnance and trade
for the IV models, with initial values of all regressors and the ratio of gov-
ernment expenditure to output as instruments. 
The results indicate a negative partial correlation between initial ﬁnan-
cial depth and subsequent interest rates, but the results for trade and initial
income (right panel) are larger when we exclude Japan and Australia. These
countries were far more isolated both economically and geographically
from the others, and it is thus likely that convergence would have been
slower for them. The regressions in the right-hand panel seem to ﬁt the con-
ditional convergence model more snugly, with initial income entering with
the expected negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, and inﬂation entering with
an expected positive coeﬃcient that is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. The
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Table 8.7 Interest Rate Regressions, 1850–1914
Dependent Variable: Long-Term Interest Rate
12 Countries Exclude Australia and Japan
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Constant 4.401** 4.665** 4.665** 6.724** 7.162** 7.358**
(0.862) (0.962) (0.958) (0.936) (0.974) (0.940)
Log of initial real per  0.059 0.041 0.038 –0.297* –0.353** –0.390**
capita GDP (0.137) (0.154) (0.154) (0.152) (0.159) (0.154)
Ratio of broad money  –2.138** –2.437** –2.147** –2.290** –2.512** –1.971**
to GDP (0.815) (0.885) (0.913) (0.775) (0.810) (0.808)
Ratio of trade to GDP –0.192 –0.343**
(0.158) (0.137)
Inﬂation rate 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.053 0.055* 0.052*
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031)
R2 0.268 0.294 0.309 0.355 0.394 0.447
N 101 93 93 87 84 84
Notes: The dependent variable is the average nominal long-term interest rate over a ﬁve-year period. Pe-
riod dummies are included in the regressions but not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
OLS regressions use initial values in each ﬁve-year period as regressors. The IV regressions use the peri-
odic data averages as regressors, and the initial values of the ratio of government expenditure to output
and the full set of regressors (except inﬂation, which enters as a period average) as instruments.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.ﬁnal IV speciﬁcation reveals a partial correlation between trade and subse-
quent interest rates that is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
These results are consistent with roles for ﬁnance and trade in the regres-
sions, and it is likely that they also reﬂect a combination of decreasing re-
turns to capital as globalization succeeded in directing resources to the
most productive uses and reductions in risk premiums that were made pos-
sible by the improved risk-sharing arrangements that accompany increas-
ingly sophisticated ﬁnancial systems.
In table 8.8, we present regressions that examine the other key feature of
ﬁgure 8.1—absolute convergence in nominal long-term rates. To do this, we
subtract the mean of the average interest rates of countries with observa-
tions in a given ﬁve-year period from the individual country average, and
use it as the dependent variable. The right-hand sides, estimation tech-
niques, instrument sets, and country samples are the same as in table 8.7.
These results show that, controlling for time, initial income, and inﬂation,
countries with greater ﬁnancial depth at the start of a ﬁve-year period had
long-term interest rates over that period that were closer to the periodic mean
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Table 8.8 Interest Rate Convergence Regressions, 1850–1914
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Long-Term
Interest Rate Less Cross-Country Average
12 Countries Exclude Australia and Japan
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Constant 1.818** 1.914** 1.913** 0.381 0.633 0.626
(0.610) (0.671) (0.672) (0.686) (0.712) (0.720)
Log of initial real per  –0.145 –0.151 –0.152 0.091 0.060 0.061
capita GDP (0.097) (0.107) (0.108) (0.111) (0.116) (0.118)
Ratio of broad money  –1.022* –1.136* –0.985 –1.145** –1.273** –1.292**
to GDP (0.577) (0.617) (0.641) (0.568) (0.592) (0.619)
Ratio of trade to GDP –0.100 0.013
(0.111) (0.105)
Inﬂation rate 0.030 0.027 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.026
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
R2 0.122 0.156 0.164 0.147 0.191 0.191
N 101 93 93 87 84 84
Notes:The dependent variable is the absolute value of the diﬀerence of the average nominal long-term in-
terest rate for a country over a ﬁve-year period and the cross-country average for that period. Period
dummies are included in the regressions but not reported. Standard errors are in parentheses. The OLS
regressions use initial values in each ﬁve-year period as regressors. The IV regressions use the periodic
data averages as regressors, and the initial values of the ratio of government expenditure to output and
the full set of regressors (except inﬂation, which enters as a periodic average) as instruments.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.of the sample than those that were less ﬁnancially developed by our mea-
sure. Trade eﬀects, though important in reducing the level of interest rates,
do not appear to contribute to their convergence over the 1850–1914 period.
8.5 Conclusion
Our paper brings together two strands of the economic literature—that
on the ﬁnance-growth nexus and that on capital market integration—and
explores the key issues surrounding each strand through both institutional
or country histories and formal quantitative analysis. We ﬁnd a robust cor-
relation between ﬁnancial factors and economic growth that is consistent
with a leading role for ﬁnance in a broad cross-section of seventeen
economies over the 1850–1997 period, with the eﬀects of ﬁnance strongest
prior to the Great Depression. This result suggests that our earlier ﬁndings
for the United States between 1790 and 1850 (Rousseau and Sylla 1999)
may have broader implications in other parts of the nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century world.
We next showed that countries with more sophisticated ﬁnancial systems
engage in more trade and appear to be better integrated with other
economies by econometrically identifying roles for both ﬁnance and trade
in the absolute convergence in long-term interest rates that is observed
among the Atlantic economies between 1850 and the start of the First
World War. The results, when combined with the evidence presented from
historical case studies of the Dutch Republic, England, the United States,
France, Germany, and Japan over the past three centuries, suggest that the
economic growth and increasing globalization of the Atlantic economies
might indeed have been ﬁnance-led. In short, our reading of the evidence is
that domestic ﬁnancial development promotes the capital inﬂows from
abroad that are associated with emerging markets and capital-market glob-
alization. The two are complementary. For short historical periods, inﬂows
of foreign capital may seem to substitute for domestic ﬁnancial develop-
ment. Absent the latter, however, they come to an end, usually in what are
termed “ﬁnancial crises.” For the ﬂow of foreign capital to be sustained over
long periods, a country needs to have what we have described as a good do-
mestic ﬁnancial system.
Our broad view of such a ﬁnancial system, encompassing public ﬁnance,
money, banking, a central bank, and securities markets, can incorporate
within it a number of issues of ﬁnancial history. Did adoption and adher-
ence to the gold standard give credibility to a country’s commitments and
make it easier to access international capital markets? Most likely it did, but
adoption of the gold standard itself depended on other ﬁnancial-system
components’ functioning well. Did banking promote industrialization and
economic modernization? It often did, but not always all by itself. The issue
is sometimes phrased in terms of whether banks made long-term loans
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presence or absence of securities markets. Moreover, the presence of secu-
rities markets is a deﬁnite advantage for banks, particularly joint stock and
incorporated banks, in raising their own capitals and providing market in-
struments of varying degrees of liquidity in which banks could invest funds
not employed in traditional bank lending. Are central banks necessary? Do
they do more harm than good? These issues are complicated by the fact that
most central banks evolved from public or national banks that were origi-
nally founded to serve as adjuncts of public ﬁnance. The lender of last re-
sort and other modern central banking functions emerged later in time. So
issues involving the utility of central banks cannot be separated from issues
of public ﬁnance, money, banking, and even securities markets.
These issues, and others like them, indicate that one can get only so far
by studying individual components of a ﬁnancial system without relating
them to the larger system of which they are a part and in which they func-
tion. Context matters when we study banking, central banking, money (and
exchange rate regimes), securities markets, and public ﬁnance.
Questions raised by our work here remain to be explored. Are there cases
in history, or in the world today, where ostensibly good ﬁnancial systems did
not lead to economic growth and globalization? Or are there cases in which
one or both of these occurred in the absence of good ﬁnancial systems? We
tend to doubt it, but we recognize that more investigation is needed before
we can be highly conﬁdent that good ﬁnancial systems are a key ingredient




In this section, we list the data sources for the series used in our regression
analysis. The data draw from six sources: World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators 1999 database, worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor
(2000), Bordo and Jonung (1987), Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), and
Rousseau (1999), and published interest rates from Homer and Sylla
(1996). Of course, these sources themselves draw upon a vast body of gov-
ernment documents and the collective work of generations of economic his-
torians whose eﬀorts have made it possible to consolidate key macroeco-
nomic and ﬁnancial aggregates into a database that covers the Atlantic
economies for the past century and a half. We do not list the primary
sources here, but refer the interested reader to the materials listed above for
details.
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Further, the deﬁnitions across sources of a given data item are not always
consistent. For example, we use the broad M3 aggregate as a measure of ﬁ-
nancial development for the later years of our sample, but in many cases
have only a narrower aggregate such as M2 for earlier years. When the data
are obtained from multiple sources and diﬀer in value at the point of join-
ing, we always use the most recent data as they appear and adjust earlier
data with a ratio-splice.
We present the data sources below by country.
Argentina, 1884–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator, population, money stock. 1960–97 from World Develop-
ment Indicators; 1884–1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and
Taylor (2000).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1884–1959
from Mitchell (1998b), table El, pp. 442–52.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1884–1959 from Mitchell (1998b), table G5, pp. 670–78.
Long-term interest rate. 1884–1913 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000).
Australia, 1870–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator, population. 1960–97 from World Development Indica-
tors;1870–1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1870–
1959 is M2 from worksheets underlying Bordo and Jonung (1987).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1870–1959
from Mitchell (1998a), table E1, pp. 551-58.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1870–1959 from Mitchell (1998a), table G5, pp. 905–06.
Long-term interest rate. 1870–1914 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000).
Brazil, 1880–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator, population, money stock. 1960–97 from World Develop-
ment Indicators; 1880–1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and
Taylor (2000).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1880–1959
from Mitchell (1998b), table E1, pp. 442–52.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1880–1959 from Mitchell (1998b), table G5, pp. 670–78.
Long-term interest rate. 1899–1912 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000).
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GDP, GDP deﬂator, population. 1960–97 from World Development Indica-
tors;1870–1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1870–
1959 is M2 from worksheets underlying Bordo and Jonung (1987).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1870–1959
from Mitchell (1998b), table E1, pp. 429–41.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1870–1959 from Mitchell (1998b), table G5, pp. 664–69.
Long-term interest rate. 1870–1914 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000).
Denmark, 1850–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator, population. 1960–97 from World Development Indica-
tors;1850–1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1880–
1959 is M2 from worksheets underlying Bordo and Jonung (1987); 1850–
79 is liquid liabilities of the banking system from worksheets underlying
Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1870–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1854–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
France, 1850–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1850–
1913, 1921–38, 1949–59 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor
(2000).
Population. 1960–89 from World Development Indicators; 1850–1959 from
worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1900–59
is the sum of banknote circulation from Mitchell (1998c), table G1,
pp. 788–92, commercial bank deposits from Mitchell, table G2, pp. 793–
99, and savings bank deposits from Mitchell, table G3, pp. 800–10; 1880–
99 is banknote circulation from Mitchell, savings bank deposits from
Mitchell, and M1 less circulation in the hands of the public from work-
sheets underlying Bordo and Jonung (1987); 1850–79 is the sum of ban-
knote circulation and savings deposits from Mitchell.
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1850–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1854–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
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and Taylor (2000); 1850–79 from Homer and Sylla (1996) table 25, pp.
222–23.
Finland, 1862–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1862–
1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Money stock.1960–97 from World Development Indicators;1862–1959 from
worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1862–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1882–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
Germany, 1850–1989
GDP, GDP deﬂator. 1960–89 from World Development Indicators; 1850–
1913, 1925–38, 1950–59 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Tay-
lor (2000).
Population. 1960–89 from World Development Indicators; 1880–1959 from
worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000); 1850–79 from
Mitchell (1998c), table A5, pp. 79–91.
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1850–
1944, 1948–59 is liquid liabilities in the ﬁnancial system from worksheets
underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1880–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1872–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
Long-term interest rate. 1870–1914 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000).
Italy, 1862–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1862–
1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Population. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1880–1959 from
worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000), 1862–79 from
Mitchell (1998c), table A5, pp. 79–91.
Money stock. 1962–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1880–
1961 is M2 from worksheets underlying Bordo and Jonung (1987); 1872–
79 is the sum of banknote circulation from Mitchell (1998c), table G1,
pp. 788–92, commercial bank deposits from Mitchell, table G2, pp. 793–
99, and savings bank deposits from Mitchell, table G3, pp. 800–10.
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1862–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
406 Peter L. Rousseau and Richard SyllaGovernment expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1862–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
Long-term interest rate. 1880–1914 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000).
Japan, 1885–1997
GDP. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1945–59 from Mitchell
(1998a) table J1, pp. 1025–38; 1885–1944 from worksheets underlying
Rousseau (1999).
GDP deﬂator. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1945–59 from
Mitchell (1998a) table J1, pp. 1025–38 constructed as quotient of nomi-
nal GDP and GDP in constant 1934–36 units; 1885–1944 from work-
sheets underlying Rousseau (1999).
Population. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1945–59 from
Mitchell (1998a) table A5, pp. 57–63; 1885–1944 from worksheets under-
lying Rousseau (1999).
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1945–59
is the sum of banknote circulation from Mitchell (1998a), table G1,
pp. 830–37, commercial bank deposits from Mitchell, table G2, pp. 848–
56, and savings bank deposits from Mitchell, table G3, pp. 864–68; 1878–
1944 from worksheets underlying Rousseau (1999).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1860–1959
from Mitchell (1998a), table E1, pp. 538–50.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1860–1959 from Mitchell (1998a), table G5, pp. 898–904.
Long-term interest rate. 1880–1914 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000).
The Netherlands, 1850–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator, population. 1960–97 from World Development Indica-
tors;1850–1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Money stock.1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators;1918–59 is
the sum of circulation in the hands of the public from Mitchell (1998c),
table G1, pp. 788–92, commercial bank deposits from Mitchell, table G2,
pp. 793–99, and savings bank deposits from Mitchell, table G3, pp. 800–
10. 1900–17 is circulation and savings deposits from Mitchell; 1850–99 is
deﬁned as in 1918–59, with commercial bank deposits interpolated under
a constant growth assumption between ﬁve-year benchmarks for 1850–74.
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1850–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1850–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
Long-term interest rate. 1850–1914 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000).
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GDP, GDP deﬂator, population.1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1865–1959 from worksheets underlying Rousseau and Wachtel (1998).
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1865–
1959 is the sum of circulation in the hands of the public from Mitchell
(1998c), table G1, pp. 788–92, commercial bank deposits from Mitchell,
table G2, pp. 793–99, and savings bank deposits from Mitchell, table G3,
pp. 800–10. Commercial and savings bank deposits were interpolated
under a constant growth assumption between ﬁve-year benchmarks for
1865–74.
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1865–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1865–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
Portugal, 1880–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator, population. 1960–97 from World Development Indica-
tors;1880–1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1880–
1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1880–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1880–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
Spain, 1850–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator, population. 1960–97 from World Development Indica-
tors;1875–1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1875–
1959 is the sum of banknote circulation from Mitchell (1998c), table G1,
pp. 788–92, commercial bank deposits from Mitchell, table G2, pp. 793–
99, and savings bank deposits from Mitchell, table G3, pp. 800–10.
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1875–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1875–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
Sweden, 1861–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator, population. 1960–97 from World Development Indica-
tors;1861–1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1870–
1959 is the sum of banknote circulation from Mitchell (1998c), table G1,
408 Peter L. Rousseau and Richard Syllapp. 788–92, commercial bank deposits from Mitchell, table G2, pp. 793–
99, and savings bank deposits from Mitchell, table G3, pp. 800–10.
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1870–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1870–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
United Kingdom, 1850–1997
GDP, GDP deﬂator. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1850–
1959 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Population. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1870–1959 from
worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000); 1850–79 from
Mitchell (1998c), table A5, pp. 79–91.
Money stock. 1994–97 is M2 from World Development Indicators; 1870–
1993 is M2 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1850–1959
from Mitchell (1998c), table E1, pp. 571–86.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1850–1959 from Mitchell (1998c), table G5, pp. 816–24.
Long-term interest rate. 1870–1914 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000).
United States, 1870–1997
GDP. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1870–1959 from work-
sheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000), 1850–69 from Berry
(1988), table 3, pp. 18–20.
GDP deﬂator. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1870–1959
from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000), 1850–1869 de-
rived as quotient of nominal and real GNP from Berry (1988), table 3,
pp. 18–20, and table 7, p. 23.
Population. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1870–1959 from
worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000), 1850–69 from Berry
(1988), table 6, p. 22.
Money stock. 1960–97 is M3 from World Development Indicators; 1870–
1959 is M2 from worksheets underlying Wachtel and Rousseau (1995);
1850–69 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld and Taylor (2000).
Imports, exports. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators; 1850–1959
from Mitchell (1998b), table E1, pp. 429–41.
Government expenditure. 1960–97 from World Development Indicators;
1850–1959 from Mitchell (1998a), table G5, pp. 664–9.
Long-term interest rate. 1870–1914 from worksheets underlying Obstfeld
and Taylor (2000), 1860–69 are high-grade railroad bond yields from
Homer and Sylla (1996), table 42, pp. 309–10.
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Comment Charles W. Calomiris
Do good ﬁnancial institutions promote economic growth? To what extent
are the gains from international linkages contingent on the prior establish-
ment of a robust domestic ﬁnancial system? These questions, posed by
Rousseau and Sylla, are important, and the contributions they make to-
ward answering them are signiﬁcant. In no other paper of which I am aware
have the methodologies of narrative economic history and econometrics
been combined so well to analyze the nexus among ﬁnance, growth, and in-
ternational openness over a long stretch of time for so many countries. The
careful assembly and use of pertinent data is impressive. The empirical evi-
dence and narrative lend support to the authors’ working hypotheses that
(a) a robust domestic ﬁnancial system is conducive to growth, and (b) a ro-
bust domestic ﬁnancial system attracts foreign capital, thus magnifying
both the gains from good domestic ﬁnancial institutions and the gains from
participating in global commodity and factor markets.
The authors begin by deﬁning what constitutes a good domestic ﬁnancial
system. They provide narrative historical case studies of the development of
such systems in Great Britain, the Netherlands, the United States, France,
Germany, and Japan, and show that the development of a good ﬁnancial
system, in each of these important cases, predates periods of rapid eco-
nomic growth. In the formal econometric analysis in the paper, the authors
show, more generally, that the establishment of a proper domestic ﬁnancial
system (indicated by the ratio of M3 to GDP) predates growth in per capita
income, growth in trade, and interest rate convergence to the international
norm. The case studies are authoritative and fairly convincing, and the
cases are historically important, involving large countries and important
turning points in global economic development. The stories are told well.
The regression evidence is new and interesting, and is consistent with a
growing empirical literature that suggests strong causal links from domes-
tic ﬁnance to economic growth in the post–World War II era (for reviews,
see Beim and Calomiris 2001, ch. 2–4, and World Bank 2001).
Not surprisingly in a paper of this scope, the analysis raises interesting
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Bureau of Economic Research.questions that the paper does not fully answer. Two of the most important
questions that arise in the paper are (a) can one be sure that the statistical
measures of ﬁnancial progress are exogenous with respect to economic
growth, and (b) which element of domestic ﬁnancial progress is most im-
portant for producing economic growth?
A convincing econometric demonstration of exogeneity of M3-GDP
would require the identiﬁcation of instruments—variables that are clearly
correlated with ﬁnancial development and not with economic develop-
ment. Lagged M3-GDP or lagged inﬂation (which the authors employ) are
not satisfactory in this regard, since both are endogenous to economic
growth, which is itself serially correlated. Of course, part of the appeal to
combining historical case studies and statistical evidence is that the case
studies help to establish the exogeneity of ﬁnancial institutions by describ-
ing the importance of historical forces other than prior economic growth in
establishing good ﬁnancial institutions.
Another empirical question relevant for determining the direction of
causality is whether M3-GDP proxies for investment (because bank credit
responds passively to investment-related demands for funds), given that in-
vestment is not included in the system of equations. In other words, one
could argue that M3-GDP plays a passive role in economic growth but ap-
pears to be important in causing growth because of the exclusion of invest-
ment from the system of equations.
Even if one accepts the causal interpretation of the authors—that a good
ﬁnancial system promotes growth—there is still the intractable problem of
determining which element of ﬁnancial development discussed by the au-
thors matters most for promoting economic growth, trade, and ﬁnancial in-
tegration. I am not very troubled by the authors’ choice of M3-GDP as a
measure of ﬁnancial development, despite the exclusion of securities mar-
ket depth from the measurement of ﬁnancial development. In a single num-
ber M3-GDP captures reasonably well the two basic building blocks of any
ﬁnancial system—a transacting system and a credit system—because M3
combines currency (whether provided by banks or the government) with
bank deposits (an indicator of bank credit and liquidity). Liquidity and
credit are crucial prerequisites to the development of securities markets. In-
deed, banking system depth and securities market depth tend to be posi-
tively correlated across countries precisely because the two go hand in
hand. This should not be surprising. Bank lending is an early form of ﬁ-
nance for ﬁrms that eventually move to securities markets, and banks pro-
vide important sources of credit to securities market dealers.
Despite M3’s appeal as a measure of ﬁnancial system activity, the M3 ag-
gregate does not distinguish among the various aspects of ﬁnancial devel-
opment. Good monetary policy raises money demand, which can raise M3
and contribute to economic growth. By establishing a reliable hard money
standard, a country may encourage foreign capital inﬂows (what Bordo and
414 Peter L. Rousseau and Richard SyllaRockoﬀ [1996] have termed the “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval”
from adopting the gold standard), which can also raise M3 and promote
growth. Good banking policy can increase private bank chartering, which
can raise credit supply, which is also reﬂected in M3, and which also can
contribute to growth. Which is the more important inﬂuence, sound money
or abundant bank credit?
Nor does the M3 measure distinguish between the activities of private
and public banks, both of which contribute to deposit and credit creation.
The authors’ stories revolve mainly, but not entirely, around the role of
private bank ﬁnance in domestic economic development, but they also rec-
ognize the importance of stable money and of developed public ﬁnancial in-
stitutions (central banks or public banks). In some of the early episodes of
ﬁnancial development the authors discuss (the early British and Dutch ex-
periences) it is even diﬃcult to separate the private from the public charac-
ter of banking enterprises. Was government policy (e.g., empire building via
the creation of joint stock companies, including banks) more or less impor-
tant than the supply of domestic credit for spurring Dutch and British
growth? Was the eﬀect of banks on the ﬁscal health of the government rel-
atively  important or unimportant? All these inﬂuences—private credit
supply, ﬁscal health, stable money, mercantilist ﬁnancing of empire—are
mixed in the “black box” of M3.
In summary, the excellent paper by Rousseau and Sylla charts an ambi-
tious course and, not surprisingly, poses more questions than it resolves. We
can look forward to future work by these and other authors that will inves-
tigate further the directions of causation between real and ﬁnancial growth,
and the relative importance of the various parts of ﬁnancial development
for economic development.
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